PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL: WHY DIDN’T SAGE PRODUCTS CREATE A NEW FORESEEABILITY
LIMITATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS?
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INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Sage Products v. Devon,1 in which the court
appeared to create a new doctrine limiting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents in patent
infringement cases. At the time, commentators dubbed this new doctrine “patent drafter
estoppel”2 and predicted that it would be “a significant development favoring potential
infringers.”3 In reality, however, the Federal Circuit has backed away from creating such a
“weapon for alleged infringers,”4 repeatedly holding that its decision in Sage Products
represented nothing more than a straightforward application of the well-known rule against using
the doctrine of equivalents to vitiate a claim limitation.
This paper will explore the Federal Circuit’s failure to create the patent drafter estoppel
limitation and will attempt to determine whether the court’s decision was a good one from the
perspective of advancing relevant patent law policies. Part I will describe equivalent
infringement analysis and the policies that are sought to be advanced in the patent law system.
Part II will examine Sage Products itself. Part III will discuss the two lines of thought that
emerged after the Sage Products decision was rendered. Finally, Part IV will analyze these
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conflicting interpretations with respect to their advancement of patent law policy and determine
why the court’s decision was consistent with patent law policy.

I. GENERAL PATENT LAW BACKGROUND

A. Policies at Work in Patent Law
The United States patent law system is the result of several conflicting policy goals.
Several policies behind the patent system are dictated by the United States Constitution, while
others have been developed through case law to keep the system functioning more smoothly.
The patent system is provided for in the United States Constitution, which grants
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”5 The
grant of power provides the first policy embodied in the patent system: grants of patents must
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”6 Generally, this means that the patent system
must operate in a way that promotes innovation. Also contained within the grant of
Congressional power is the patent system’s second policy: by granting to inventors only the
“Right to their respective . . . Discoveries,”7 the Constitution ensures that the patent system will
not operate in such a way as to remove knowledge from the public domain. These twin
policies—encouraging significant innovation and ensuring that, once available to the public,
knowledge is never again made the subject of protection—form the constitutional underpinning
of the United States patent system.

5

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
6

2

Over time, the courts have refined these policies somewhat, defining several goals for the
patent system that allow concepts to be evaluated to determine whether they are consistent with
patent policy. The goal of encouraging significant technological advances is still alive and well.8
However, this goal is now seen as one half of “a careful balance,” the other side of which is
encouragement of “imitation and refinement through imitation.”9 All patent policies therefore
must be interpreted in light of how well they advance the twin goals of encouraging significant
and pioneering technological advances and encouraging design-around behavior and other
secondary improvements.
The additional goals of the patent system are derived from these two overarching
principles. The constitutional mandate to ensure that knowledge once made available to the
public does not become the subject of patent protection is enforced by a policy that “Congress
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”10 The goal of
encouraging secondary innovation is advanced by the patent system’s disclosure requirements,
which require an inventor to divulge enough about his invention to enable others to make and use
it before gaining protection for the idea.11 The patent system also requires clear enough
disclosure that the public is made sufficiently aware of the scope of issued patents to avoid
infringing them when attempting to imitate or design around them.12
Thus, any new concept that purports to change the patent system for the better must
support these five general policies, or at least must advance more of them than it retards. First, it
8

See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1989).
Id. at 146.
10
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
11
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
12
Id.; General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (the strict disclosure requirement
“seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty
as to their rights.”); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (the purpose of the disclosure requirement “is
not only to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.”).
9

3

must encourage primary innovation, significant advances in technology. Second, it must
encourage design-around behavior or other secondary innovation. Third, it must not allow
knowledge that is already freely available to the public to be removed from the public domain.
Fourth, it must encourage inventors to disclose the inventions fully in order to give those skilled
in the art the ability to make and use the invention. Finally, it must encourage inventors to
disclose their inventions clearly in order to give adequate public notice of the patent’s existence
and scope.
B. Infringement of Patents
Once a patent is issued, the inventor (or the person to whom she assigns the patent) has a
right to exclude others from nearly any use of the patented invention.13 In any case where patent
infringement is at issue, the courts must grapple with exactly how broad the patent’s scope is and
whether the alleged infringer’s product falls within that scope.
While the determination of a patent’s scope might seem a simple matter of construction,
there are at least two problems that preclude such a rosy view of the scope determination. First,
the language used by the inventor in her patent application may fall short of a perfect description
of her invention, leading to fights over exactly what the language means. Even the Federal
Circuit, whose mission is to create consistency by providing “a forum for appeals from
throughout the country in areas of the law [such as patent law] where Congress determines that
there is special need for national uniformity,”14 has not reached consensus on exactly how to
carry out such a fundamental task as patent claim construction.15
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Second, and more importantly for current purposes, accused devices may infringe patents
even when they do not fit within the exact limitations defined by the patent claim language itself.
Were patent scope limited to the literal scope defined exactly by the language of patent claims, it
would be possible for an alleged infringer to escape liability for infringement by making only a
few very insubstantial changes to the patented invention. There would be no infringement of the
patent, since the alleged infringer would have produced a product outside the scope of the
patent’s claims, but the infringer might still have practiced the patented invention nonetheless,
because language is an imprecise tool for describing the highly technical concepts at issue in
patent law.16 To keep this situation from arising, to keep people from “practice[ing] a fraud on a
patent,”17 the doctrine of equivalents is used to provide the patentee with scope beyond the literal
words of her patent claims and to the full extent of her actual invention.
When an accused infringer makes only insubstantial changes to a patented invention, he
is said to have infringed the patent under the doctrine of equivalents, or to have committed
equivalent infringement (as opposed to literal infringement). Since Graver Tank, courts have
generally (although not exclusively) used the “function-way-result” test to determine whether an
accused device is equivalent to a given patent claim.18 Under this test, if the accused device
achieves the same result as the patentee’s invention and does so by “perform[ing] substantially
the same function in substantially the same way” as the patented invention, there may be
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equivalent infringement.19 Otherwise, the alleged infringer’s device has more than insubstantial
changes from the patented invention, and there is no infringement.
C. Legal Limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents
Perhaps because it is such a broadly stated doctrine, the doctrine of equivalents is subject
to some degree of abuse. When applied, it offers patentees broader protection than they would
be allowed under a strictly literal interpretation of their claim language, with the result that
competitors seeking to design around the patent without committing infringement might have
trouble ascertaining the actual scope of the patent’s claims. For this reason, several legal
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have evolved. Each limitation restricts the range of
equivalents to which the patentee is entitled, controlling the application of the doctrine of
equivalents so as to limit its adverse effects on public notice of patent claim scope.
1. The All-Elements Rule
In order to maximize the public notice of patent claim scope provided by claim language,
any finding of equivalent infringement must be rooted in that language. Thus, any determination
of the scope of equivalents due a patent claim must take note of the language the patentee chose
to use to define her invention; the doctrine of equivalents is meant only to correct for inevitable
failures of language, not to substitute the court’s judgment for that of the patentee. In order to
ensure the patentee’s chosen language is not forgotten in determining the proper scope of
equivalents, the courts have developed the all-elements rule.
Under the all-elements rule, the “function-way-result” test is to be applied to each
individual claim limitation separately, rather than to the claim as a whole.20 This approach
prevents the doctrine of equivalents from being used “to effectively eliminate [an] element in its
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entirety.”21 Since each patent claim comprises multiple elements or limitations, and since
“[e]ach element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the
patented invention,”22 the equivalency test must be applied to each element separately. Because
the all-elements rule protects the materiality of each claim limitation, it is often described as a
rule against vitiating a limitation.
2. Prosecution History Estoppel
As with the all-elements rule, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel exists to limit
the application of the doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rosecution
history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”23
It does so by ensuring that, if a patentee voluntarily surrenders material during patent
prosecution, she cannot later reclaim that material under the doctrine of equivalents.24 Although
the exact contours of the doctrine are still being shaped following the Festo decisions,
prosecution history estoppel generally is applied after a court undertakes two inquiries. First, the
court must determine whether the patentee made a narrowing amendment to his claim during
patent prosecution.25 Second, the court must determine whether the amendment was for a reason
related to patentability.26 Festo held that an amendment made to cure any defect in the patent
application was an amendment for reasons related to patentability.27 If an amendment was both
narrowing and for patentability reasons, then prosecution history estoppel applies, and the
21
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patentee may be precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture any subject matter
she surrendered via the amendment.
3. Specification Dedication
Another legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is the doctrine of specification
dedication, as laid out in the majority opinion in Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co.28
Under this doctrine, when the patentee discloses a range of possible equivalents in the patent’s
specification but fails to claim some of them, she is deemed to have dedicated the unclaimed
equivalents to the public.29 They cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents.
4. Prior Art Preclusion
The doctrine of prior art preclusion provides an important and sometimes very broad
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. Under the prior art preclusion doctrine, the patentee
cannot use the doctrine of equivalents to gain protection for equivalent structures that are within
the public domain, such as structures that are part of the prior art.30 This ensures that the
doctrine of equivalents is not used to take knowledge out of the public domain in violation of the
policy underpinning the patent system. If an accused infringer can demonstrate that his allegedly
equivalently infringing device is only practicing the prior art, he will be found not to infringe
under the doctrine of equivalents, since the doctrine of prior art preclusion will prevent the
patentee from gaining such broad protection.31
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5. Specification Estoppel
Specification estoppel, sometimes referred to as the all-advantages rule, limits the
doctrine of equivalents by requiring an infringing equivalent to provide all the specified
advantages of the patented invention. Thus, when a patentee discloses in the patent specification
multiple functions performed by a given claim limitation, the accused device must perform all of
those functions in order to be found to infringe the patent.32
The doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, the topic of this article, would, if adopted, join
this list of legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. As discussed below, the Federal
Circuit appears to have declined to create such a doctrine.

II. SAGE PRODUCTS: THE GENESIS OF PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL?

The case of Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. dealt with alleged infringement
of patents covering containers for safely “disposing of hazardous medical waste, including
hypodermic needles.”33 In holding that the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s patents
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit at first blush appeared to have created a
new legal limitation on that doctrine. To understand the new “patent drafter estoppel” doctrine,
it is necessary to understand the facts of Sage Products.
Sage Products developed and patented “a disposal container”34 for medical waste. The
container was designed so that a user could dispose of the waste without coming into contact
with any hazardous medical waste, such as used hypodermic syringes, already deposited in the
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container.35 To accomplish this, Sage Products designed its containers as closed vessels with
elongated slots protected by a closure mechanism with two constrictions, one above the slot and
one below it.36
Sage Products’ claim language reflected its design. As quoted by the court, the relevant
patent claim read as follows:
1. A disposal container comprising:
a. a hollow upstanding container body,
b. an elongated slot at the top of the container body for permitting access to the
interior of the container body,
c. barrier means disposed adjacent said slot for restricting access to the interior of
said container body, at least a portion of said barrier means comprising:
i. a first constriction extending over said slot, and
ii. a complementary second constriction extending below said slot, and
d. a closure disposed adjacent said slot.37
The defendant in the case, Devon Industries, produced competing containers for
disposing of hazardous medical waste. Devon Industries’ containers were designed and
constructed with a lid that could be lifted, exposing constrictions inside the container that
allowed needles to be deposited in the container but did not allow a user to reach inside the
container and contact previously disposed waste.38 However, because any structure that could be
called an elongated slot in Devon Industries’ containers was located inside the container body,
rather than “at the top of the container body,”39 as required by Sage Products’ patent, the court
held that Devon Industries’ products did not literally infringe the patent.40
As to equivalent infringement, the Federal Circuit noted that, since the Devon Industries’
product had its “first constriction,” “elongated slot,” and “second constriction” located inside the
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container, rather than on top of the container, a finding of equivalent infringement would
improperly eliminate the element of Sage Products’ claim that required the elongated slot to be
located “at the top of the container body.”41 However, the court then went on to discuss the
“inherent conflict between the role of the doctrine [of equivalents] in preventing ‘fraud on a
patent’ and the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of a patentee’s exclusive rights.”42
If the court did in fact create a new doctrine limiting the application of the doctrine of
equivalents, it must have done so in this latter discussion. In fact, the Federal Circuit did note
that Sage Products’ patent covered “a relatively simple structural device.”43 Given this
simplicity of design, “a skilled patent drafter would [have] foresee[n] the limiting potential of the
‘over said slot’ limitation.”44 The inventor (or his patent attorney) was not prevented by any
“subtlety of language or complexity of the technology”45 from drafting a broader claim that did
not include this element. Thus, given the relative simplicity of the invention, a reasonable
inventor should have foreseen devices like the defendant’s product and could easily have drafted
his claims more broadly, so as to cover that product literally.46 Given that Sage Products opted
not to draft the claims this way, one could argue that they intended to exclude from their patent
claim scope devices like that produced by Devon Industries.47
This discussion could certainly be interpreted as creating a new legal limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents. At least with “relatively simple structural device[s],”48 like those at
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issue in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel seems to create a foreseeability
limitation. While the doctrine of equivalents may apply, its application is limited, and protection
is not granted against equivalent structures that the patentee reasonably should have foreseen but
chose not to claim. In fact, it is just this interpretation of Sage Products that excited the patent
law bar shortly after the decision was handed down.49 However, as discussed below, the
subsequent interpretation of this case by the Federal Circuit demonstrates that the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel does not exist.

III. DIVERGENCE OF OPINION FOLLOWING SAGE PRODUCTS

Following the decision in Sage Products, panels of the Federal Circuit appeared to back
away from the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, although individual judges indicated in
separate opinions that they believed such a doctrine had been created.
A. Opinions Applying the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine
As ostensibly articulated in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel limits
the application of the doctrine of equivalents by denying equivalent protection against structures
that, while equivalent to the claimed invention, should have been foreseen by “a skilled patent
drafter”50 who was not prevented by any “subtlety of language or complexity of the
technology”51 from drafting a broader claim that would have covered the foreseen equivalent
structure literally. In two cases decided since Sage Products, separate opinions authored by
Judge Rader have adopted this doctrine as a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
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1. Vehicular Technologies
The case of Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International, Inc.52 is famous
for articulating the all-advantages rule as a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Rader argued that the case should have been decided on
a different ground: the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel articulated in Sage Products, rather
than the all-advantages rule, should have precluded the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.53
Vehicular Technologies dealt with improvements to automobile locking differentials,54
and the relevant portion of the plaintiff’s patent claimed a portion of the invention as “two
concentric springs bearing against one end of [a] pin.”55 The defendant’s product avoided this
limitation by using “a single spring and a plug fitting into the spring”56 instead. Although both
Judge Rader and the panel majority found no infringement, either literal or equivalent, Judge
Rader would have reached this result through the application of the patent drafter estoppel
doctrine.
Judge Rader saw a direct parallel between Vehicular Technologies and Sage Products. In
both cases, “a skilled patent drafter would readily foresee the limiting potential of” the relevant
patent claim limitation.57 In neither case would the inventor or patent agent or attorney “confront
the need for particularly subtle or ambiguous language.”58 Again, the patent drafter estoppel
doctrine appears here as a foreseeability limitation. If a reasonable inventor should have
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foreseen the defendant’s product and still chose not to claim so as to cover that product literally,
the inventor cannot get patent protection against that product.
Judge Rader noted that the facts in Vehicular Technologies were particularly damning
from a patent drafter estoppel perspective. The plaintiff had initially learned of the defendant’s
allegedly infringing product early enough that it could still have sought a broadening reissue of
its patent, redrafting its claims so as to cover the defendant’s product literally.59 Here, the
plaintiff made two errors from the perspective of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine. First, it did
not draft its claims broadly enough to cover products it should have foreseen.60 Second, even
though it had an opportunity after learning of the infringement to redraft its claims to cover
actual products of which it was aware, it failed to take advantage of that opportunity.61
2. Johnson & Johnston Associates
The majority in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc.62 used the
case to help establish the rule that equivalent structures that appeared in the patent specification
but were left unclaimed cannot give rise to liability under the doctrine of equivalents.63 As in
Vehicular Technologies, though, Judge Rader authored a concurring opinion, this time joined by
Chief Judge Mayer, arguing that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine should have been applied.64
Johnson & Johnston Associates developed and patented a process for protecting large
sheets of thin copper foil, used in manufacturing printed circuit boards, by attaching the foil to a
sturdier metal substrate sheet.65 The patent specification described substrate sheets made of
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several materials, including aluminum, nickel alloys, stainless steel, and polypropylene.66
However, the claim at issue referred specifically to aluminum substrates, omitting any reference
to sheets made of other materials.67
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rader once again employed the patent drafter estoppel
doctrine to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents. In terms even more explicit than
those employed in his concurrence in Vehicular Technologies, he referred to patent drafter
estoppel as a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of equivalents: “the doctrine of equivalents
does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the
application process and included in the claims.”68 Adopting this reasoning would help to balance
“the preeminent notice function of patent claims” against “the protective function of the doctrine
of equivalents.”69 Judge Rader made clear his belief that what he termed a “foreseeability bar”70
had already been adopted by the Federal Circuit in Sage Products.71
Thus, in both Vehicular Technologies and Johnson & Johnston Associates, some Federal
Circuit judges argued that the proper interpretation of Sage Products was that the case had
created a new doctrine placing a legal limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
This new doctrine precluded doctrine of equivalents protection against equivalent structures that
the patentee reasonably should have foreseen during patent prosecution and neglected to claim
literally. However, as discussed below, the majority of the Federal Circuit judges do not agree
with this reading of Sage Products; now that the case has been interpreted multiple times, it can
be said with confidence that the proper interpretation of Sage Products is that it did nothing more
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than reaffirm and apply the all-elements rule precluding a patentee from using the doctrine of
equivalents to entirely vitiate a claim limitation.
B. Opinions Applying the All-Elements Rule
Under the Warner-Jenkinson all-elements rule, to equivalently infringe a patent, the
accused device must have an equivalent to each element of the relevant patent claim.72 This
requirement was not met in Sage Products, since any interpretation of the claim that found
equivalents to all the structural pieces required under the claim required one or more of those
structures to be in a location at odds with the patent claim.73 Under this interpretation of Sage
Products, the Federal Circuit did not actually create any new doctrine; it simply applied the
uncontroversial all-elements rule. The language in Sage Products that seems to create a doctrine
barring patentees from seeking protection for objectively foreseeable equivalents is then dictum.
This interpretation of the case has been adopted by the majority in several Federal Circuit cases.
1. Overhead Door
Perhaps the clearest expression of the all-elements rule interpretation of Sage Products
comes in Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc.74 This case involved a patent on
improved automatic garage door openers.75 The patentee had developed and patented a system
whereby a garage door opener could “learn” the codes associated with several transmitters; this
prevented the installer or user from having to set DIP switches identically on each transmitter
and on the garage door opener itself.76 The patent claimed a system for allowing the opener to
learn the code associated with a transmitter that required the user to choose a memory location
72
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manually by setting a physical switch.77 However, the accused device accomplished this
learning function automatically, using software to determine where in its memory to store the
new transmitter code.78 The district court had granted summary judgment to the defendant,
holding that the accused device did not infringe the patent either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.79
In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that Sage Products did
not limit the scope of equivalents available to the patentee.80 It described the earlier case as
applying a doctrine preventing the use of the doctrine of equivalents to “utterly writ[e] out of the
claim not one, but at least two (maybe more) express limitations of the claim.”81 The doctrine of
equivalents argument was clearly precluded by the actual, express language of the claim at
issue.82 This is an interpretation of Sage Products as applying the all-elements rule. Noting that
the plaintiff’s equivalence argument in Overhead Door did not require the complete vitiation of a
claim element, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the doctrine of
equivalents issue.83
Overhead Door did not expressly reject the patent drafter estoppel doctrine interpretation
of Sage Products, but it did characterize the earlier case in a radically different way, as a simple
application of the all-elements rule to “a relatively simple structural device.”84 However, if Sage
Products actually did create a new doctrine limiting the application of the doctrine of
equivalents, the Federal Circuit has been remarkably reluctant to apply that doctrine. Overhead
Door provided the court with an opportunity to interpret Sage Products as creating the doctrine
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of patent drafter estoppel, but the court declined the invitation and instead merely applied an
existing limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
2. Johnson & Johnston Associates
As noted in Judge Rader’s concurrence, discussed above, the majority opinion in Johnson
& Johnston Associates is consistent with either interpretation of Sage Products. The Federal
Circuit held that, because the patentee in Johnson & Johnston Associates had disclosed several
possible substrate materials but had chosen to claim only aluminum, there could be no doctrine
of equivalents protection against a defendant whose products used one of the disclosed but
unclaimed substrate materials.85 Judge Rader, in his concurring opinion, argued that doctrine of
equivalents protection was unavailable because the disclosure of other substrate materials in the
patent specification showed that those materials were foreseeable to the patentee at the time of
application.86 However, the majority refused to go this far, holding instead that disclosure of an
equivalent combined with a failure to claim that equivalent precluded protection for that
equivalent because it showed a conscious decision on the part of the patentee to dedicate the
disclosed and unclaimed subject matter to the public.87
Johnson & Johnston Associates, then, is another example of the Federal Circuit’s
reluctance to adopt patent drafter estoppel as a new legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents. As an en banc decision, it is highly indicative of the opinion of the court as a whole,
rather than simply of a few renegade judges. The Federal Circuit seems either to believe that no
new doctrine was created in Sage Products or that the new doctrine should be subordinated to
existing limits on the doctrine of equivalents.
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3. Fin Control Systems
The Federal Circuit also rejected the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage
Products in Fin Control Systems Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc.88 This case involved a patent on
removable fins for surfboards.89 In relevant part, the patentee had claimed a system for attaching
the removable fins to a surfboard that involved parts of the fin being “laterally engage[ed] . . .
[by] means applying lateral force to” those parts.90 The allegedly infringing product used a
similar system that attached the removable fins to a surfboard at the front surface of the relevant
structure (rather than at the left or right side, as would be required to meet the “operating
laterally” limitation).91
In holding that the accused product did not infringe the patent under the doctrine of
equivalents, the Federal Circuit used Sage Products. The court affirmed the lower court’s
holding that finding equivalent infringement “would improperly read the ‘lateral’ and ‘side’
limitations out of [the claim at issue].”92 In making this holding, the court cited Sage Products,
implicitly suggesting that the holding of that case related more to the rule against vitiating a
claim limitation than to a new doctrine imposing a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents.93 In a parenthetical comment, the court described Sage Products as holding that
“reading limitations out of the claims, including by interpreting limitations in such a way that
they do not have their normal meaning, is inappropriate in an analysis pursuant to the doctrine of
equivalents,”94 a clear endorsement of the view that Sage Products merely applied the all-
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elements rule rather than creating a new doctrine. Even the language used by Judge Rader to
support the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage Products was appropriated by the
majority in Fin Control Systems as support for the all-elements rule interpretation.95
In Overhead Door and Johnson & Johnston Associates, the Federal Circuit majority was
able to avoid adopting the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage Products by applying an
already-existing doctrine to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents, leaving open the
question of whether, under some circumstances, Sage Products might later be interpreted as
Judge Rader suggested it should be. Fin Control Systems forecloses this possibility, though,
since the language that arguably could support the patent drafter estoppel interpretation is shown
to be merely an amplification of the rule against entirely vitiating a claim limitation.
4. SciMed Life Systems
In SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.,96 the Federal
Circuit clearly articulated its interpretation of the ambiguous language in Sage Products. The
earlier case was described as having “determined that because the scope of the claim was limited
in a way that plainly and necessarily excluded a structural feature that was the opposite of the
one recited in the claim, that different structure could not be brought within the scope of patent
protection through the doctrine of equivalents.”97 This interpretation makes no mention of a
foreseeability limitation; rather the important inquiry under the SciMed Life Systems
interpretation of Sage Products is whether the patent in some way “clearly exclude[s] certain
subject matter, [thereby] implicitly disclaim[ing] the subject matter that was excluded.”98
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From these cases, the appropriate interpretation of Sage Products can be derived. Far
from creating a new doctrine denying doctrine of equivalents protection to objectively
foreseeable equivalents, as suggested by Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit merely reaffirmed the
all-elements rule precluding a patentee from reclaiming under the doctrine of equivalents subject
matter that was disclaimed under the literal claim language.
The cases interpreting Sage Products demonstrate the ways in which a patentee might
disclaim subject matter that could not be reclaimed under the doctrine of equivalents. In Johnson
& Johnston Associates, the patentee declined to claim an allegedly equivalent structure, even
though it described that structure in the patent specification.99 In Fin Control Systems, finding
the defendant’s structures equivalent to the patent claim limitations would have required giving
those limitations meanings widely divergent from their normal definitions.100 Sage Products,
then, merely provides yet another way in which a patentee can inadvertently disclaim subject
matter: the patentee in Sage Products worded its claim such that finding an equivalent to one
limitation necessarily required reading another limitation out of the claim.101 This is the correct
interpretation of Sage Products in light of subsequent cases. A patentee cannot recover via the
doctrine of equivalents any subject matter that is disclaimed in her patent, either explicitly or
implicitly. Sage Products slightly expanded the all-elements rule; in addition to requiring an
equivalent to each element, the rule post-Sage Products clearly also precludes eliminating one
element in order to find an equivalent to another element.
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IV. SHOULD THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL INTERPRETATION HAVE PREVAILED?

As is clear from the discussion above, the Federal Circuit has discarded the patent drafter
estoppel interpretation of Sage Products, and no such foreseeability limitation on the application
of the doctrine of equivalents appears to exist under current Federal Circuit jurisprudence. Was
this the correct interpretation? The Federal Circuit had the opportunity after Sage Products to
use the case to define a new doctrine requiring patentees to claim literally any equivalent
structure that was reasonably foreseeable; was the court correct to decline to take this
opportunity? As shown below, these questions can be answered in the affirmative. The court’s
decision was correct both because it avoided creating intractable litigation problems and because
it comports with relevant patent law policy.
A. The Best Argument for the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine
As Judge Rader phrased it, the best argument for adopting the doctrine of patent drafter
estoppel is that it greatly amplifies the degree to which patent claim language can notify the
interested public of the actual scope of issued patents.102 This argument sounds reasonable in
light of the enhancement to the public notice function provided by other legal limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents. In fact, while each of the patent system policies discussed above103 is
advanced by some limitations on the doctrine of equivalents and restrained by others, the policy
of providing the interested public with adequate notice of the scope of issued patents is
uniformly advanced by all of the existing doctrines limiting the application of the doctrine of
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equivalents.104 When Judge Rader suggests that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine will provide
a similar “enhance[ment of] the public notice function of claims,”105 he is relying on this
presumed truism: the doctrine of equivalents limits the ability of the public to determine the
scope of an issued patent from documents that are publicly available, such as the patent claims
themselves, so any limitation on the application of the doctrine must increase public notice.
However, as discussed below,106 the issue is not nearly this simple, and Judge Rader’s reliance
proves ill-placed.
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances
While limitations on the doctrine of equivalents consistently advance public notice, most
of the doctrines limiting the doctrine of equivalents do not help to encourage significant,
pioneering technical innovations, since these limiting doctrines generally operate by limiting the
scope of protection available to the inventor, providing a smaller reward for creating a
pioneering invention and thereby reducing the incentive to invent. However, the doctrine of
prior art preclusion does at least indirectly advance the policy of encouraging pioneering
technical innovation. The prior art preclusion doctrine precludes an inventor from receiving
doctrine of equivalents protection against any equivalent structure which is a part of the prior
art.107 Thus, this doctrine tends to encourage inventors to direct their efforts towards inventions
that have few equivalents in the public domain. Pioneering inventions, by definition, represent
greater advances past the current state of the art than do inventions merely refining existing
technology. Thus, pioneering inventions are incentivized by the doctrine of prior art preclusion.
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While the prior art preclusion doctrine helps advance the goal of encouraging significant
technological advances, the other existing limitations on the doctrine of equivalents do not
advance this goal. Since the limiting doctrines have inconsistent effects on the goal of
encouraging pioneering technical advances, and because most of these doctrines do not help
achieve this goal, the advancement of this policy cannot be the driving force behind the legal
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. Like most of the limiting doctrines, the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel also does not encourage inventors to purse pioneering technical
innovations.
2. Encouraging Refinement through Imitation
In contrast to the policy of encouraging significant technological advances, the
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents generally do help achieve the goal of encouraging
modest advances in technology and refinement through imitation. In each case, the limiting
doctrine increases public notice of the scope of issued patents, which makes it easier for
inventors to improve upon previously patented inventions without fear of being accused of
infringement.
Once again, the exception to the general trend is the doctrine of prior art preclusion. This
doctrine merely allows the public the freedom to practice the prior art where they might not
otherwise be able to do so. Since the prior art represents neither a significant technological
advance nor a modest advance achieved through refinement, allowing the public to practice the
prior art can hardly be said to advance either policy encouraging technological innovation.
However, because prior art preclusion has a different effect on the goal of encouraging
refinement through imitation than do the other legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents,
this policy goal cannot be the chief driving force behind those limiting doctrines.
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3. Preserving Knowledge Already in the Public Domain
With the exception of prior art preclusion, none of the doctrines limiting the application
of the doctrine of equivalents has any great effect on achieving the goal of denying patent
protection for any knowledge already within the public domain. For the most part, these legal
limitations limit patent scope by denying protection to equivalent structures that are neither in the
public domain nor protected under the literal language of the patent claims.
As with the policies of encouraging primary and secondary inventiveness, the exception
here is again the doctrine of prior art preclusion. By denying the patentee protection for
equivalent structures that appear in the prior art and that are therefore in the public domain, this
doctrine helps to preserve the integrity of the public domain. Under the doctrine of prior art
preclusion, patent protection is simply not available, under either a literal infringement or an
equivalent infringement theory, for anything already available to the public.
Again, the various legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have differing effects
on the advancement of the policies at work in the patent system. The doctrine of prior art
preclusion advances the goal of denying protection for knowledge already within the public
domain, while the remaining doctrines have no effect on the achievement of this goal. Since the
doctrines largely do not advance this policy, and since they have differing effects, protecting the
integrity of the public domain cannot be the driving force behind limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents.
4. Encouraging Complete and Adequate Disclosure of Inventions
Perhaps the most complicated set of effects on patent policy of the various doctrine of
equivalents-limiting doctrines occurs in the area of encouraging complete disclosure of new
inventions. This policy does not drive the limits on the doctrine of equivalents, since the limiting
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doctrines, to the extent they have any effect at all, generally have negative effects on the
advancement of the goal of complete disclosure.
Neither the all-elements rule nor prior art preclusion has any significant effect on
encouraging complete disclosure of inventions. However, the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel negatively impacts the policy of encouraging inventors to disclose their inventions fully.
By making greater disclosure during patent prosecution, the patentee provides later accused
infringers with the ammunition needed to mount a defense based on prosecution history estoppel.
Thus, greater disclosure results in a patent whose scope is more limited. Patent applicants
naturally seek the broadest patent protection possible, so the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel creates an incentive to disclose as little as possible.
The doctrine of specification dedication operates in a similar way. By removing from the
scope of an issued patent any equivalent structures that appear in the specification but not in the
literal claim language, this doctrine creates an incentive for patentees to disclose no more than
absolutely necessary for their claims to be allowed. This is contrary to the patent policy of
encouraging full disclosure of inventions.
While the doctrine of specification dedication might discourage a patentee from
disclosing what he considers unpatentable equivalent structures, the doctrine of specification
estoppel, or the all-advantages rule, creates an incentive for patent applicants to avoid disclosing
all the advantages their design might possess. Any advantage disclosed could potentially be used
against the patentee later to limit the scope of protection afforded under the issued patent.
Thus, the policy of encouraging complete disclosure of inventions cannot be the chief
driving force behind the various legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. At best, those
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limiting doctrines have no effect on the advancement of the disclosure policy, and at worst they
discourage efforts to achieve full disclosure.
5. Increasing Public Notice of the Scope of Issued Patents
The final patent law policy, that of ensuring that the interested public is well-informed of
the scope of issued patents, is advanced by all of the doctrines that limit the application of the
doctrine of equivalents. This policy, then, must be the main driver behind the limitations, and an
argument that the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel advanced this policy would therefore be
the best argument for the adoption of the new doctrine.
With the all-elements rule, the interested public is at least made aware of the elements
that must be present to infringe an issued patent. This allows later inventors seeking to design
around the patent to focus their efforts on removing an element or creating a design with a nonequivalent structure in place of a necessary element. Without the all-elements rule, the doctrine
of equivalents might be applied to a patent claim as a whole, greatly expanding the number of
possible equivalent structures and making the exact scope of the patent claim difficult to
ascertain. Thus, the all-elements rule advances the patent system’s goal of increasing public
notice of the scope of issued patents.
Similarly, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel greatly advances the interested
public’s knowledge of the scope of issued patents. The doctrine limits the scope of issued
patents based entirely upon the prosecution history, which is available to any interested member
of the public. The limitation is also applied in a mostly predictable way. At the very least, with
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, the interested public knows that no equivalent
structures disclaimed in the prosecution history may be claimed under the doctrine of
equivalents.
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Specification dedication has a similar effect on the goal of increasing public notice of the
scope of issued patents, although its effect is smaller than that of either the all-elements rule or
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. With the doctrine of specification dedication,
competitors and other interested members of the public know for certain that any equivalent
structure disclosed in the specification but not claimed is fair game for use in an invention that
attempts to design around the patent in question. Without the doctrine, these structures might be
within the scope of patent protection under the doctrine of equivalents, and competitors might be
forced to guess at the actual scope of the patent.
Similarly, the doctrine of prior art preclusion makes it clear to the interested public that
any equivalent structure falling within the public domain may be incorporated into a later
invention. The rule helps to make the limits of patent scope clear to the public.
Finally, the doctrine of specification estoppel helps to increase public notice of the scope
of issued patents by making the scope of patent protection depend upon the advantages disclosed
in the specification. The specification is public information, easily available to anyone aware of
the patent. The specification estoppel doctrine ensures that the publicly-known specification is
tied to the scope of patent protection, increasing public notice of the patent’s scope.
Thus, the existing doctrines that limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents all
advance the patent system’s goal of increasing public notice of the scope of issued patents. If
there is an argument to be made for the adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, it must
be that it also helps achieve this goal. This is exactly what the proponents of the new doctrine
suggest. In his concurrence in Johnson & Johnston Associates, Judge Rader suggests that
adopting the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would “enhance[] the notice function of claims.”108
The reasoning behind this view is simple and, at first glance, beguiling. The doctrine of
108
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equivalents provides a patentee with a broader scope of protection than mere literal interpretation
of his patent claims would allow. This excess protection is ill-defined, since its contours are
never explicitly located and are held to encompass a particular device only after extensive
litigation. Thus, the doctrine of equivalents is a barrier to achieving complete public notice of
the scope of patent claims. Any limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents, then,
must increase public notice. As shown below,109 even this best argument for the adoption of the
patent drafter estoppel doctrine does not hold up under closer scrutiny.
B. Litigation Implications of the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine
Had the Federal Circuit created a new patent drafter estoppel doctrine in Sage Products,
it would have created serious problems for patent infringement litigants and for courts
adjudicating patent infringement cases. Thus, the court made the correct decision when it
declined to interpret its Sage Products decision as creating such a doctrine.
To understand the problems the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would create in patent
infringement litigation, one need only recognize that the doctrine would require the court to
assess whether a given structure, found to be equivalent to a limitation contained in the patent
claim at issue, would have been foreseeable to the reasonable inventor at the time the patentee
applied for her patent.110 The term of a patent generally ends 20 years after date on which the
patent’s application was filed.111 Thus, a foreseeability determination under the patent drafter
estoppel doctrine might be made as long as 20 years after the date on which the foreseeability is
to be evaluated.112 In many cases, the patent itself would offer insufficient evidence to determine
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exactly what was foreseeable at the time the patent was prosecuted. Thus, expert testimony
would be needed, creating a significant new expense for litigants on both sides and requiring
judges and juries to assess the credibility of witnesses in an entirely new area.
In many ways, the foreseeability determinations that would need to be made under the
patent drafter estoppel doctrine resemble the determinations that courts already struggle with in
the area of patent obviousness. Obviousness determinations require the court to investigate
whether the invention “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which [the invention] pertains.”113 This is similar to the
foreseeability determination that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would require, because it
forces courts to evaluate the knowledge of typical practitioners in a relevant field at a point in
time remote from that when the determination is made.
Given that the two determinations are qualitatively similar, they might be expected to
experience similar pitfalls. For example, in determining whether an invention is obvious, courts
have been warned against using hindsight, since all inventions seem more obvious after they are
made than they did beforehand.114 To ensure that the disclosure of the patentee’s own invention
is not used against her in order to render the invention obvious, courts have developed “objective
evidence of nonobviousness,”115 factors which must be considered when making an obviousness
determination. These factors include “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and]
failure of others,”116 and, “when present [they must] always be considered as an integral part of
the analysis.”117
113
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Determination of a given equivalent structure’s foreseeability at the time of patenting
would suffer from a similar problem. At the time of litigation, the defendant (and possibly others
as well) will have developed the equivalent in question. It is not difficult to imagine the
existence of the equivalent structure offering courts an opportunity to improperly use hindsight
to determine that a reasonable inventor should have been able to foresee the equivalent at the
time the patent was applied for. Objective considerations similar to those used in obviousness
determinations would need to be developed, and these considerations would greatly add to the
length and complexity of patent infringement litigation.
The difficulty inherent in making foreseeability determinations in patent infringement
cases is not immediately apparent from the cases in which Judge Rader argued that the patent
drafter estoppel doctrine should be applied. Sage Products, Vehicular Technologies, and
Johnson & Johnston Associates all involved patents that provided completely intrinsic evidence
of objective foreseeability of equivalents, making resort to evidence outside the patent
unnecessary. In Sage Products, the invention was “a relatively simple structural device,”118
something that surely is not guaranteed in all doctrine of equivalents cases. A much more
complicated invention would lead to foreseeability determinations that were more difficult to
make and therefore required much more information and a greater commitment of judicial
resources.
In Johnson & Johnston Associates, the equivalents in question were actually disclosed in
the specification without being claimed.119 Clearly, if the patentee itself knew enough about the
equivalent substrate materials to disclose them at the time it filed its patent application, those
equivalent materials were foreseeable. Thus, the foreseeability determination in Johnson &
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Johnston Associates was trivial, masking the difficulty of the determination process in the typical
patent infringement case.
Similarly, the patentee in Vehicular Technologies was aware of the defendant’s
equivalent structure very shortly after receiving its patent, since it had the opportunity to seek a
broadening reissue that encompassed the defendant’s product in its literal claim language.120 The
period during which a broadening (as opposed to a narrowing) reissue can be sought is only “two
years from the grant of the original patent.”121 Development of an equivalent within such a short
time period may suggest that, at the time the patent was issued, there is a good chance that the
equivalent technology was foreseeable. Such circumstances are unlikely to be present in all
doctrine of equivalents cases, though. Judge Rader’s patent drafter estoppel doctrine may be
capable of being applied in cases where foreseeability determinations are so easy to make, but its
application in more complicated cases would likely be much more impractical. Given that
similar limits on the doctrine of equivalents are possible using only already-existing doctrines,
the need for such an expensive and cumbersome new doctrine seems unclear.
C. Policy Implications of the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine
In addition to creating serious practical problems for litigants and courts, the adoption of
the patent drafter estoppel would be detrimental to the policies underlying the patent law system.
Those policies include encouraging significant technological advances,122 encouraging secondary
advances in technology that build upon prior significant advances,123 ensuring that no knowledge
is removed from the public domain,124 encouraging dissemination of technological information
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via disclosure of new inventions,125 and ensuring that the scope of issued patents is clear so that
competitors can operate without committing infringement.126 The patent drafter estoppel
doctrine generally does a poor job of advancing these policy goals, compared with simple
application of existing legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances
A primary purpose of the patent law system is to encourage significant, pioneering
technological advances.127 This goal is achieved “by securing . . . to . . . Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”128 Because the patentee has a right to exclude others from
practicing the invention, she can invest time, money, and effort in opening a new area of
technology, secure in the knowledge that her patent will allow her to recoup her investment
through sales in a market where no one else is allowed to compete without first getting her
permission. Because it depends for its advancement upon the creation of a patent monopoly, the
goal of encouraging pioneering inventions is most greatly advanced when the terms of that
monopoly are most favorable to the inventor. Thus, any restriction in the subject matter the
patentee may protect under her patent reduces the incentive to invent and acts as a barrier to
achieving the policy goal of encouraging pioneering technological advances.
From the perspective of this policy, the doctrine of equivalents is a useful tool. At worst,
it ensures that the patent right is not completely gutted of all meaning, since it allows the
patentee to defend her patent rights even when an infringer makes a few insubstantial changes to
the invention. At most, it allows the patentee somewhat broader coverage than she would be
allowed under her literal language. Either way, the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude is
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greater with the doctrine of equivalents than without it. The doctrine of equivalents thus helps to
encourage the development of significant and pioneering inventions.
If the doctrine of equivalents helps achieve the policy goal of encouraging significant
technological advances, any legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents must frustrate that
goal. This is not to suggest that some limits are not necessary. After all, the language of the
claims is paramount, and the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to grant the patentee
protection against equivalent structures that are clearly excluded by her chosen claim
language.129 However, the imposition of a new legal limitation, such as that represented by the
patent drafter estoppel doctrine, is contrary to the policy of encouraging inventors to invest time
and effort in developing pioneering technological advances.
2. Encouraging Secondary Technological Advances
The patent system seeks to encourage significant and pioneering technological
innovations, but this is not the only goal of the system. It is balanced against “the recognition
that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”130 This balance recognizes that an important goal of the
patent system is to encourage inventors to build upon the earlier advances of others. The patent
system is designed to achieve this goal by requiring patentees to disclose their inventions before
being granted patent protection. The disclosure of new inventions helps educate the interested
public about the current state of the art, suggesting new avenues of inquiry and providing a
baseline for further innovation.
Unlike the encouragement of primary innovation, the goal of encouraging secondary
innovation is frustrated by a strong doctrine of equivalents. If the doctrine of equivalents is
129
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relatively unrestricted, patentees may use it to foreclose experimentation by others in areas
closely related to the patented technology (but outside the literal claim language). By contrast, a
closely circumscribed doctrine of equivalents allows secondary inventors to focus their efforts in
technical areas very closely related to the patent in question without running the risk of
infringing the patent. Thus, any legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents will help to
achieve the goal of encouraging secondary innovation via “refinement through imitation.”131
As a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, then, the doctrine of patent
drafter estoppel could be expected to advance the policy goal of encouraging secondary
innovation. Assuming that patentees would not radically change their claim drafting strategy in
response to the new limitation, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel would limit the range of
equivalents available to a patent holder. Since fewer equivalent structures would therefore be
protected under the patent, the patentee would have less ability to interfere with later innovators
operating in closely related areas. With greater freedom to investigate related technologies,
secondary innovators would be more encouraged to continue their work were the Federal Circuit
to adopt the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel.
3. Ensuring No Knowledge is Removed from the Public Domain
In addition to balancing the encouragement of primary and secondary invention, the
patent law system also has several other policy goals, including ensuring that no invention or
knowledge becomes protected under a patent once it has entered the public domain.132 Neither
the doctrine of equivalents nor its associated legal limitations have any significant effect on the
achievement of this policy goal.
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The classic operation of the doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee protection against
products developed during his patent term that use technology that did not exist at the time the
patent was applied for and issued, if those products accomplish the same result as the invention
and do so in substantially the same way in order to carry out substantially the same function.133
This simply gives the patentee protection against any embodiment of his invention, rather than
only the subset of embodiments that can be easily described at the time the patent is prosecuted.
The operation of the doctrine of equivalents has no effect on the removal of knowledge from the
public domain, since this goal is achieved or frustrated at the time a patent is issued. Once the
patent is issued, its scope is fixed, and any knowledge that will be removed from the public
domain because of the patent is removed from the public domain at that point. While the
operation of the doctrine of equivalents determines exactly what the scope of the patent will be,
it is the issuance of the patent, rather than the exact scope of the patent, that determines whether
knowledge is taken out of the public domain and made subject to patent protection.
Because the doctrine of equivalents itself has no effect on the advancement or frustration
of the policy goal of ensuring that no knowledge already in the public domain becomes protected
by a patent, no legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents can affect the achievement of this
goal. As a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, patent drafter estoppel would therefore
be neutral with respect to ensuring that knowledge in the public domain remains there.
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4. Encouraging Full Disclosure of New Inventions
The patent system is designed to encourage full disclosure of new inventions, since this
helps to ensure that society gets the maximum informational benefit from the patent quid pro
quo.134 This goal focuses not on the patent claims, but rather on the patent specification, where
the patentee is to provide a complete description of the invention sufficient “to enable any person
skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains . . . to make and use the [invention].”135 The
doctrine of equivalents, as an infringement doctrine, does not create any significant incentive
either for or against full disclosure, since it focuses in its operation on the patent’s claims and the
accused device.
However, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, if adopted, might create an incentive not to
disclose inventions absolutely fully. In determining whether a given equivalent structure was
foreseeable at the time the patent in question was prosecuted, a court will need contemporary
evidence, and the court will likely find it necessary to examine the patent specification as a
portion of that contemporary evidence. Judge Rader’s concurrence in Johnson & Johnston
Associates provides a clear example of this tendency. There, the evidence that substrate
materials other than aluminum were foreseeable at the time of patent prosecution was provided
by the patent specification’s reference to other substrate materials, including steel, the material
used by the defendant.136 Without a broad disclosure like that in Johnson & Johnston
Associates, it would be more difficult for a court conclusively to determine that a particular
equivalent should have been foreseen.
Thus, were patent drafter estoppel to be adopted, unscrupulous patentees would have a
reason to hide equivalent structures that they foresaw by failing to disclose them at all. In this
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way, they could ensure that full disclosure could not be used against them later. Patent
applicants and their agents or attorneys would operate under the maxim “Aut tace, aut loquere
meliora silentio.”137 The goal of encouraging full disclosure of inventions to ensure that society
receives the maximum return for its grant of monopoly power would be frustrated.
5. Providing Adequate Public Notice of the Scope of Issued Patents
The final policy underlying the patent system is that proper notice should be given to the
public of the existence of issued patents and the scope of those patents.138 This notice is
necessary to allow competitors the opportunity to conduct their business without infringing the
patent, and it assists secondary innovators in determining what areas of technology need
investigation and which areas are closed to further investigation because they are the subject of
patent protection.
To a certain degree, the doctrine of equivalents frustrates this policy goal. If patents
could only be infringed by producing devices falling within the literal claim language, the scope
of patent protection would be eminently clear. By creating a penumbra of protection
surrounding the literal claim language, though, the doctrine of equivalents reduces the ease with
which the scope of an issued patent can be determined. Competitors and secondary innovators
must make their best guess as to what similar techniques, structures, and approaches the courts
will deem equivalent.139 If they are particularly risk-averse, competitors and secondary
innovators will structure their activities so as to avoid any conceivably equivalent device, greatly

137

“Be quiet, unless your speech be better than silence.” See National Gallery, London, Self Portrait of Salvator
Rosa (c. 1645), at http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.dll/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/
work?workNumber=NG4680 (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
138
Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) (describing patent claims as “providing
the public with adequate notice of potentially infringing behavior.”) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
139
This is perhaps not quite as bad as it sounds, since even in the absence of the doctrine of equivalents, competitors
seeking to operate in technical areas near the patent without infringing it will need to make their best guess as to the
way a court will construe the literal claim language.

38

restricting the amount of further research and “refinement through imitation” that the patent
system is supposed to encourage.
Since the doctrine of equivalents frustrates the policy goal of providing adequate public
notice of the scope of issued patents, any limitation on the doctrine of equivalents should help
achieve that goal.140 However, one should resist the temptation to think that all legal limitations
on the doctrine of equivalents are equally effective in reducing the size of the penumbra
surrounding the literal claim language. In fact, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, if adopted,
might make matters worse rather than better.
The concern with the doctrine of equivalents is that it does not permit competitors to
determine the best course of action to avoid infringement a priori, because the determination of
which structures are equivalent to the claim limitations at issue can be accomplished only by a
court after the fact. The adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine as a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents would not eliminate this problem, since the doctrine of equivalents would
still be operable. The new doctrine would merely add yet another post facto inquiry to the
doctrine of equivalents analysis. As with claim construction, determination of the foreseeability
of a particular equivalent requires consideration of evidence not a part of the public record, such
as expert witness testimony. The determination of whether an equivalent structure was
objectively foreseeable at the time the patent in question was prosecuted simply cannot be
carried out by a competitor or secondary innovator seeking the appropriate course of action; it
must be accomplished by a court after the fact.
Without the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, a party interested in avoiding patent
infringement need only make two guesses as to the scope of the patent. First, the party must try
to determine how the patent claims will be construed. Second, the party must guess what
140
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structures will be held equivalent to the limitations of the claims as construed. The party may
then proceed with its business in such a way that it does not use any structures that it believes
will fall within either the construed literal claim language or the scope of equivalents to the
claims.
Were the patent drafter estoppel doctrine to be adopted, competitors and secondary
innovators would still be required to make these same inquiries before undertaking any activity
within a technology area closely related to that covered by the patent in question. They would
also need to make an additional guess about what a court would hold, though: in addition to
trying to determine whether a contemplated structure would be fall within the literal claim
language or would be considered equivalent to a claim limitation, they would be required to
guess whether the court would find the structure an objectively foreseeable technological
development. The patent drafter estoppel doctrine thus increases the uncertainty surrounding the
scope of issued patents, rather than decreasing it. The doctrine runs contrary to the policy goal
of ensuring that there is adequate public notice of the scope of issued patents.
The patent drafter estoppel doctrine, then, generally would cause more problems than it
would solve. The need for objective indicia of foreseeability and the requirement for additional
extrinsic evidence would greatly complicate patent infringement litigation. At the cost of
making litigation more cumbersome, no policy goal of the patent law system would be advanced
more than moderately, and more goals would be frustrated than would be advanced. The policy
goals of encouraging significant and pioneering technological advances, encouraging full
disclosure of new inventions, and ensuring that there is adequate public notice of the scope of
protection under issued patents would all be frustrated by the adoption of the patent drafter
estoppel doctrine. The doctrine is neutral as to the policy goal of ensuring patent protection is
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not given to any knowledge already within the public domain. It would only advance the goal of
encouraging secondary innovation via “refinement through imitation.” The advancement of this
single goal is not worth the frustration of several other policies, particularly when one considers
the additional litigation costs that would be incurred were the doctrine to be adopted.

CONCLUSION

The Sage Products decision presented the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to adopt a
new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine. This
new doctrine would have limited the application of the doctrine of equivalents by precluding
equivalent infringement protection for any equivalent structure that the patentee reasonably
should have foreseen during patent prosecution. Since Sage Products, the Federal Circuit
appears to have declined the invitation to create this new foreseeability limitation on the doctrine
of equivalents. This course of action was wise, because the patent drafter estoppel doctrine
would have caused patent infringement litigation to grow more cumbersome and expensive with
no corresponding increase in the advancement of patent law policy goals. In fact, the new
doctrine would have frustrated more patent system policies than it advanced. In short, the
doctrine of patent drafter estoppel is dead and should stay dead.
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